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“Unintended-acceleration” automobile accidents typically begin when the driver first enters 
the car, starts the engine, and intends to press his/her right foot on the brake while shifting 
from Park to a drive gear (Drive or Reverse). The driver reports an unintended (uncommanded) 
full-throttle acceleration, coupled with a loss of braking, until the episode ends in a crash. Pedal 
misapplications – where the right foot contacts the accelerator instead of the brake that was 
intended – have been linked to these accidents (Schmidt, 1989, 1993) which, in the 1980s, were 
thought to occur only at the start of a driving cycle (and/or with the car in Park). But, in 1997 , we 
identified over 200 pedal errors as the cause of accidents reported in the North Carolina database; 
these crashes occurred during the driving cycle (Schmidt et al., 1997), and/or with the vehicle 
in a gear other than Park. Our present work provides a more thorough analysis of these North 
Carolina Police Accident Reports from 1979 to 1995.  The vast majority of pedal misapplications 
(over 92%) (a) occurred during the driving cycle, (b) were generally in “unhurried” conditions, 
and (c) were categorically separate from those events referred to as unintended-acceleration 
episodes at start-up.  These ideas are explanatory for the recent (2009–2010) surge of unintended-
acceleration reports, perhaps even suggesting that all of these crashes are caused by pedal 
errors, and that none of them are based on some vehicle defect(s).
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In the 1980s, a number of researchers began to suspect that these 
episodes might have a human-error component (e.g., Schmidt, 1989; 
Reinhart, 1994), and that a search for an electro-mechanical defect 
might be misguided. The essential idea was that the driver, intending 
to put the right foot on the brake, would occasionally place the foot 
on the accelerator by mistake. Then, when the car moved when a drive 
gear was engaged, the driver would press harder on the “brake” to stop 
it, the vehicle would go even faster, resulting in more “brake” applica-
tion, usw., until the vehicle soon was in a wide-open-throttle condition; 
the driver (who was invariably panicked) was rendered incapable of 
diagnosing the situation in the few seconds before a crash occurred.
In the 1980s, these accidents were mainly associated with the 
start of a driving cycle (and/or otherwise initiating driving with 
the vehicle in Park gear, such as at a fast-food drive-through or at 
an outside bank-teller’s station). These types of accidents led to 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) formal 
definition which tended to confine UA crashes to purely start-up 
events (Pollard and Sussman, 1989).
Less well known are the frequency and type of pedal errors that 
occur during the driving cycle (i.e., with the vehicle already in Drive or 
Reverse). These events do not fall easily under the above NHTSA defi-
nition, even though (subsequent to the error) they seem to have many 
features in common with UA (full throttle, relatively long duration: 
several seconds or longer). In 1997, we (Schmidt et al., 1997) found a 
surprising number and variety of pedal errors leading to accidents, but 
which were not the “official,” NHTSA-defined UA situation (because 
they did not start with the vehicle in Park or at low initial speed).
IntroductIon
The term “unintended acceleration” (UA – sometimes called “sud-
den acceleration”) was coined in the 1980s to describe a type of 
automobile accident that was attracting considerable attention at 
the time. In these episodes, the driver would report that, as he/
she was initiating a driving cycle, after starting the engine, plac-
ing the right foot lightly on the brake (to prevent the car from 
“creeping”), and shifting from Park to a drive gear (usually Park 
or Reverse, depending on the situation), the vehicle would go to 
an uncommanded (i.e., unintended) wide-open-throttle condition, 
coupled with an apparent loss of braking effectiveness (Pollard and 
Sussman, 1989; Reinhart, 1989; Schmidt, 1989, 1993). The epi-
sode would often end with a crash. In the 1980s, there was a surge 
of UA reports, representing almost every brand of automobile. 
This situation resulted in a frantic search by three federal govern-
ment agencies, various auto makers, and several private research 
firms, for some electrical/mechanical defect that would cause these 
events. None was ever found. This naturally resulted in consider-
able publicity (e.g., newspaper and magazine articles, and even a 
“60 Minutes” television report; CBS, 1986) and substantial public 
awareness.
Over the next few decades, this situation gradually faded from 
public awareness. Recently, however, in 2009–2010, a similar situ-
ation has seemingly returned. For many of us who worked on this 
problem in the 1980s, the current situation brings the problem 
again to mind again, creating the suspicion that the same phenom-
ena are still operating (or are operating again).Frontiers in Psychology  |  Movement Science and Sport Psychology    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 209  |  2
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Such a subset will surely underestimate the total number of such 
accidents, as many drivers are reluctant to admit their error; and, 
some crashes are very minor and do not result in accident reports. 
And, of course, an unknown number of pedal errors may have been 
corrected before a crash actually occurred.
In order to find NHTSA-defined UA events, we reviewed the 
pedal-error accidents identified in this later study to determine if 
any of these cases could also be construed as an NHTSA-defined 
“unintended-acceleration” event, where a driver (a) shifts from 
Park to either Drive or Reverse at the start of a driving cycle, (b) 
incurs a sudden and unexpected vehicle acceleration, (c) reports 
a perceived failure of the brakes, and (d) reports a malfunction of 
the throttle or accelerator pedal. This analysis, however, produced 
no crashes that fit the NHTSA criteria for UA.
We then searched the accident database (for the years from 1979 to 
1995) using key words believed to characterize NHTSA-defined UA 
episodes based on the accident narratives. These words included sud-
den, malfunction, runaway, stuck, shift, throttle, gear, control (for out of 
control), and produced over 43,000 accident records. We then reduced 
the set by combining various key words (e.g., accelerator stuck), and 
adding other keywords, which included terms such as park, jump, start, 
unexpect (for unexpected or unexpectedly), etc., to eliminate those acci-
dents that were clearly not pedal-error based (e.g., accidents involving a 
car door stuck open). We then read and categorized these narratives.
rESuLtS
Of the accidents identified, two distinct sets of pedal errors were 
found: (a) 3740 accidents which were clearly caused by pedal misap-
plication, and (b) a non-overlapping 39 reports that were NHTSA-
defined UA episodes. This represents an important finding, in that 
our earlier understanding of pedal errors was that they were associ-
ated mainly with the start of the driving cycle. With this evidence, 
it is now clear that pedal misapplications can occur frequently in 
several additional ways, perhaps as Rogers and Wierwille (1988) 
have found in simulators.
cLaSSIfIcatIonS
The first of several classifications concerned whether the driver was 
parking or driving. “Parking” involved those situations where the car 
was in a parking lot, home garage, or was being parked in a parking 
space on the street. “Driving” included all other situations, where it 
was clear that the vehicle was being driven on the road or highway 
(and therefore was not in Park). Some of the crashes that occurred 
while driving might well have been classed as parking accidents, how-
ever – e.g., where the vehicle was being driven to a parking space.
Next, for each of these accidents we coded the pedal misapplica-
tion as either a slip from the brake, or as hitting the “wrong pedal” 
(the accelerator) without first slipping from the brake. Also, we 
classified the scenario as (1) hurried, (2) unhurried, or (3) distracted 
to identify the urgency or other extenuating circumstances involved 
in the attempted brake application.
For the driving accidents, we made one additional classification 
concerning the circumstances of the pedal application. These were 
classified as accidents in which the vehicle or driver was (1) turn-
ing, (2) slowing (“normally”), (3) stopped, or (4) other. For the 
parking accidents, we classified them as occurring in the forward 
or backward direction.
In our initial work (Schmidt et al., 1997), we examined the North 
Carolina Police Accident Report database for the years 1979 and 1980 
to determine the kinds of pedal errors that were made, the   contributing 
factors, and the frequency of these events. We discovered 219 accidents 
for which the driver admitted having made a pedal error as a direct 
cause of the crash. These pedal errors occurred in many different driv-
ing situations (i.e., all with the vehicle being in one of the drive gears 
other than Park when the episode began). We were surprised that these 
accidents appeared to represent a fundamentally different type of acci-
dent initiation from that previously classified (by NHTSA; Pollard and 
Sussman, 1989) as UA. One principal difference is that the drivers in 
our pedal-error investigation knew (and admitted) that they had made 
an error, and offered this information to the investigating authorities. 
However, the drivers in NHTSA-defined UA episodes typically did not 
know that they had made a pedal error; in fact, the latter drivers were 
typically emphatic that they did not make a pedal error.
This distinction means that, if a pedal error caused an NHTSA-
defined UA episode, the driver would report the cause in terms such 
as accelerator malfunction, stuck throttle, failed brakes, etc. However, 
for the second class of pedal-error accident (caused by an admit-
ted pedal error, at speed, and with the vehicle not being in Park), a 
different type of accident description would be given by the driver; 
here language such as hit (i.e., the wrong pedal), miss (the brake), 
slipped (from brake to accelerator), usw. In the present paper, we 
expanded our search for this second type of pedal-misapplication 
crash, using North Carolina data from the years 1979 through 1995. 
Here, we report our examination of these two classes of accidents, 
and their relative frequencies, asking whether they can be considered 
as separate phenomena or as variants of the same phenomenon.
MatErIaLS and MEthodS
The accident-report database from North Carolina contains over 
one million accidents of almost all types, where the accident was 
sufficiently serious to warrant a police report. The database includes 
the verbatim, written statement of the investigating officer describ-
ing how the accident happened, based in part on statements made 
by the driver(s) of the involved vehicle(s) and/or eye-witnesses or 
passengers. These narratives can be searched for various key words, 
depending on the overall research goal. Our keyword evaluation of 
these narrative statements produced two different searches: one for 
recognized and/or admitted pedal errors, and a second for NHTSA-
defined UA episodes where the driver stated that his/her right foot 
was on the brake, and was not on the accelerator (i.e., pedal error was 
not admitted). A key question was whether or not these two searches 
would result in overlapping subsets of the accident database.
We first searched for keywords such as brake, foot, gas, pedal, and 
acc (for accelerate, accelerator, etc.), resulting in more than 94,000 
accident reports. Next, we searched this subset with more detailed 
keywords to isolate accidents thought to be caused by pedal misap-
plications, such as miss, slip, instead, etc. This trimmed the set to 
about 20,000 accidents for which we were at least suspicious that 
a pedal error had led to the crash.
The next step was to read the remaining narratives to verify 
that the accident was, in fact, related to a pedal error. This process 
eliminated many cases which were not associated with pedal misap-
plications (e.g., “The driver swerved to miss a dog”). The final result 
was a set of 3740 accidents that satisfied our pedal-error criteria.www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 209  |  3
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On the other hand, for accidents wherein the driver was making a 
turn, most (134) were associated with the driver hitting the “wrong 
pedal,” whereas only 97 of these turning accidents involved slips 
from the brake.
unIntEndEd-accELEratIon EpISodES
Keyword-search results for NHTSA-defined UA episodes produced 
only 39 accidents (Table 4). In these accidents, the drivers’ accident 
description to the reporting officer indicated that the vehicle sud-
denly accelerated immediately or soon after the vehicle was placed 
into Drive or Reverse from either Park or Neutral. In these accidents, 
there was a fairly uniform description of the accident by the driv-
ers. Nearly all of the accidents occurred in a parking lot, driveway, 
or parking space; one incident took place at an outdoor service 
window of a bank. Seventy-two percent (28/39) of the accidents 
involved a forward acceleration of the vehicle. And, in the major-
ity of these accidents (62%, 24/39), the driver indicated that the 
accelerator (or throttle) malfunctioned (e.g., hung, stuck); none of 
the drivers attributed their accidents to human error.
dIScuSSIon
Consistent with our earlier findings (Schmidt et al., 1997), these 
data clearly contradict earlier ideas that pedal misapplications are 
associated only with the start of a driving cycle, such as in the 
NHTSA-defined UA episodes (e.g., Pollard and Sussman, 1989; 
Schmidt, 1989). We find that the overwhelming majority of the 
pedal misapplications (about 99%) occurred after initial start-up, 
and a surprisingly small percentage (only about 1%) were NHTSA-
defined UA episodes.
The findings also provide interesting insight about how such 
simple limb movements in automobiles lead to on-road accidents 
of various types. Contrary to the notion that pedal errors occurred 
mainly as a result of being hurried (or distracted) – both of which 
could lead to a fast response, and, therefore, a less-accurate response 
(Schmidt et al., 1979) – a majority of the pedal misapplications 
parkIng accIdEntS
Only 279 of the 3740 accidents were involved in what we consid-
ered parking operations (see Table 1). These were divided between 
moving forward (216) and backward (63). In terms of mecha-
nisms of the misapplication, 126 accidents were caused by slips 
from the brake, and 153 occurred because the driver hit the “wrong 
pedal” for some reason. Only 19 of the accidents were classified 
as hurried, with 213 not hurried, and 47 distracted. It is curious 
that the nearly half of the accidents occurring in parking opera-
tions happened because the driver for some reason hit the “wrong 
pedal,” with over three-quarters of the accidents being under non-
hurried conditions.
drIvIng accIdEntS
The overwhelming majority of accidents caused by pedal misap-
plications occurred under driving conditions (92.5%, see Table 2). 
Of these, 2640 were caused by a slip, whereas the remainder (821) 
resulted from the driver pressing the “wrong pedal.” Also, there were 
more unhurried driving accidents (2938) as compared to those 
hurried (268) or distracted (255). This trend is similar to that seen 
in the parking actions.
The circumstances surrounding the pedal misapplications were 
then separated into three categories (see Table 2). The largest single 
category was slowing (“normally”), with 793 accidents, followed by 
stopped and turning, with 673 and 231 accidents, respectively. We 
could not classify 1641 accidents from the narratives alone.
We found an apparent interaction between the type of pedal 
misapplication and the driving circumstances surrounding it (see 
Table 3). First, for accidents that occurred while the vehicle was 
stopped, most (604) were associated with slipping of the foot from 
the brake, whereas only 69 were caused by hitting the “wrong pedal.” 
Table 1 | Parking accidents (279/3740 or 7.5%).
Characteristic  Number
Slip  126
“Wrong pedal”  153
Forward direction  216
Backward direction  63
Hurried  19
Unhurried  213
Distracted  47
Table 2 | Driving accidents (3461/3740 or 92.5%).
Characteristic  Number
Slip  2640
“Wrong pedal”  821
Hurried  268
Unhurried  2938
Distraction  255
Slowing (“normally”)  793
Turning  231
Stopped  673
Other  1641
Table 3 | Pedal-error type as a function of driving circumstances.
Action  Type of pedal error
  Slip  “Wrong pedal”
Stopped  604  69
Slowing  613  180
Turning  97  134
Table 4 | NHTSA-defined unintended-acceleration events.
Driving circumstances  Number
Parking   38
Other  1
Forward direction  28
Backward direction  11
Accelerator problem  24
Problem unknown  15
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vs. (b) some electro-mechanical vehicle defect. Indeed, if NHTSA-
defined UA is caused by a vehicle defect, then locking the transmis-
sion in park until one of the driver’s feet is on the brake, preventing 
a UA event, supports a pedal-misapplication theory, and rejects a 
theory involving some vehicle defect.
To this understanding, we now add the finding that these pedal 
misapplications can occur in other ways than at vehicle start-up. 
They can occur during a driving cycle when the vehicle has already 
been shifted from Park to Drive or Reverse, under which condi-
tions the shift interlocks can no longer be effective (because the 
vehicle is no longer in Park). And, this latter type of UA (after 
vehicle start-up) appears to be far more frequent than the episodes 
occurring at start-up; our data show that only about 1% of the 
UA episodes are of the type defined by NHTSA at start-up, the 
remainder being caused by pedal misapplications after start-up. 
We think that his last observation helps us understand why all of 
the UA episodes were not eliminated by the car-makers’ adoption 
of some variant of the shift interlocks in the 1980s; some of the 
pedal misapplications probably occurred after the car had been 
shifted from Park.
Finally, in the situation involving UA in the 1980s, despite formal 
searches by a number of research groups, no electro-mechanical 
defect was ever found that would account for the accidents. And, 
since we have considerable evidence that UAs can be caused by 
pedal misapplications, we are left with the possibility that all of 
the 1980s UAs were pedal-error based. With the present-day surge 
in reported UA events, the situation is almost the same. Granted, 
some have suggested that the UAs can be caused by sticking pedals 
or by floor mats trapping the accelerator pedal; but these explana-
tions can account for only a small number of these events. This 
raises the possibility that, as with UA in the 1980s, the majority, or 
even essentially all of the present-day UAs may be based on pedal 
misapplications, with none being caused by some vehicle defect(s) 
(Schmidt, 2010).
occurred under unhurried conditions. Also, the type of error where 
the driver hit the “wrong pedal” occurs more frequently in driving 
situations that involve turning, perhaps indicating that there is an 
influence of the upper limb or body that creates a more erroneous 
lower-limb condition. Clearly, these findings on pedal misapplica-
tions point out the need to understand more completely the proc-
esses that produce pedal-based accidents on the road.
Several aspects of our data deserve further study. Two main 
classes of explanations have been proposed for pedal errors: errors 
in response choice (e.g., turn right rather than left), and errors in 
response execution (e.g., moving slightly too far). Schmidt (1989) 
has  argued  that  UAs  behave  like  response-execution  errors  in 
many ways, sensitive to the same factors that influence variability 
in human aiming movements, and are unlikely to be recognized 
as errors by drivers who have just made them. Many of the pedal 
errors that occur during driving, however, and which are reported 
as such by drivers, may be of this type (e.g., Rabbitt and Rodgers, 
1977; Reason, 1990); such errors are susceptible to being recognized 
by performance-monitoring mechanisms.
Our data here can help us understand some fundamental prin-
ciples of pedal misapplications. The NHTSA-defined UA events 
appear to be caused chiefly by an error in aiming the foot toward 
the brake during a nearly simultaneous shift from Park to one of 
the drive gears, Drive or Reverse (Schmidt, 1989). This type of 
error was recognized in the 1980s, and interlocks were designed to 
prevent them. This interlock prevented this type of UA by locking 
the shift lever in Park until the brake pedal was depressed. If a pedal 
misapplication should be made at the start of a driving cycle (i.e., 
pressing the accelerator rather than the brake that was intended), 
the vehicle will not move, as it is safely locked in Park. These inter-
locks were overwhelmingly successful in reducing NHTSA-defined 
UAs (Reinhart, 1994), decreasing their incidence by approximately 
60%. Also this success of the shift interlocks served as a crucial test 
of the hypotheses that UA was caused by (a) pedal   misapplications 